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POSITIVELY NORMATIVE (ACCOUNTING) THEORIES 
Introduction and background 
Among accounting researchers there is a growing awareness of the Importance 
of epistemological and methodological reflections upon the development of their 
field. What exactly is the nature of "scientific" knowledge about accounting? 
How is such knowledge generated and how is its validity to be assessed? What 
is the relationship between accounting practice and accounting theories? And 
what role has scientific knowledge to play in the formulation of accounting 
policy? These are some of the questions to which researchers have traditionally 
devoted little attention, but which recently have gained increasing recognition. 
Indeed, the realization that unsatisfactory answers to these questions form a 
major impediment to the further development of accounting research is rapidly 
gaining ground. 
One reason for thls change of attitude has probably been the increasing di-
versity in accounting theories and research approaches. This trend is exempllfied 
by the failure of the AAA Committee on Concepts and Standards for External 
Financial Reports to prepare an updated version of A Statement of Basic Account-
ing Theory (ASOBAT, 1966). Faced with fundamental changes in our discipline 
and with a bewildering diversity of research perspectives on accounting issues, 
the committee produced a Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance 
instead (SATTA, 1977). Note that (1) SATTA is not a statement of_ accounting 
theory but a statement on accounting theory and (2) the committee apparently 
feit compelled to expand the scope of its enquiry to include theory acceptance. 
This was, of course, only a natural response to its finding that numerous 
competing accounting theories could be identified. 
Unfortunately, however, the committee chose to interpret the present 
stage in accounting theürizing only in terms of one particular perspective, 
-2-
namely that of Kuhn (.1970). Kuhn's account of scientifie development is 
mainly historical and sociological, however. It has little to offer 
with respect to the justification of criteria for theory acceptance. It 
is, therefore, probably safe to assume that SATTA's description of 
theory acceptance (of rather the lack of general acceptance) wetted the 
appetite for methodological prescription, without satisfying it. 
A second reason for the growing awareness of methodological problems in 
accounting research is probably the internationalization of the accounting re-
search community. Fartly as a result of similar trends in accounting practice, 
researchers are increasingly exposed to other cultures. Thus they encounter 
different perspectives on accounting research, practice and policy. They come 
to appreciate how these perspectives are determined by cultural, social and 
institutional factors. And they learn how their own perspective takes much for 
granted which isn't equally evident to researchers from other cultures. (Sée 
Busse von Colbe's contribution to this book for illustrations of these points.) 
These experiences only naturally lead to a re-examination of the foundations of 
accounting theories and particularly to a critical reflection upon their unstated 
assumptions. The importance of these insights for the development of accounting 
practice is clear from the problems which are encountered in the international 
harmonization of accounting (of which Muis gives some European examples in this 
book). The difficulties which already exist in securing theory acceptance at a 
national level are thus substantially augmented in an international context. 
I submit that a major portion of these difficulties can be traced to the 
role of value judgments in theory construction and acceptance.v ' This essay 
will examine this role. Specifically, it addresses the issues of the method-
ological merits of "positive" versus "normative" (accounting) theories. It is 
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therefore predominantly methodological in nature; methodology, following Blaug 
(1980), being defined as the rationale for accepting or rejecting scientific 
theories or hypotheses. The questions to be raised here are: What do we mean 
by positive and nonnative theories? What is the basic methodological difference 
between these theories? And what are the implications, if any, of this dif-
ference for the relationships of such theories with policy or practice? 
A digression to Rochester 
An examination of these questions seems especially topical in light of the 
contentions of what may be labeled the Rochester School of Accounting (Jensen, 
1976). Following Keynes (1891) and Friedman (1953) these authors define posi-
tive theory as a body of knowledge concerning "what is": nonnative theory 
tells us "what ought to be". It is asserted that accounting theory is pre-
dominantly nonnative and has had little substantive, direct impact on account-
ing practice and policy formulation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979, p. 273). -Indeed, 
in their arguments, most accounting research is "useless" because it is not 
aimed at developing a body of positive theory which is considered a prerequisite 
for answering normative questions. Because of its normative focus, research 
(2) in accounting is even "unscientific" (Jensen, 1976, pp. 2-5). 
This paper will argue that, to the contrary, if positive theory means any-
thing, it refers not to "what is" but to "what can be". Normative theory does 
teil us "what ought to be" but in a specific sense. For a theory to be normative, 
it should need a value judgment for its closure. That is to say, a truly 
(3) 
normative theoretical system cannot be made complete without a value judgment. 
The inclusion of such value judgments in normative theories is the only method-
ologically relevant criterion to distinguish them from positive theories, since 
these value judgments hamper empirical testing of the theory. Thus, positive 
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as applied to theory is basically a misnomer; it should be replaced by 
(4) 
"empirical." ' In the same vein, one cannot simply argue that a theory is 
normative because it has not been tested; a necessary condition is to show that 
it is not testable. Furthennore, one cannot denounce theories as normative 
when they are capable of yielding prescriptions of the type "what should be done 
if" (we subscribe to the postulated ïnds). As Christenson (1983) has effectively 
shown, such a conditional prescription requires the same argumentative schema 
as explanatory reasoning. We are not required to subscribe to the stated ends 
in order to accept the logic of the argument. If positive theories cannot yield 
such prescriptions, they equally cannot provide explanations and would seem to 
bc restrici.ad to descriptions. Such positive/descriptive theories of "what 
is" would certainly provide an insufficiënt theoretical basis for practice and 
policy formulation. Finally, it will be argued that the practical or political 
usefulness of accounting theories cannot be based solely on methodological 
considerations. A broader perspective has to be adopted which includes the 
social circumstances in which knowledge is generated and used. 
Terminology and overview of the paper 
As will already be evident, we have here enormous potential for termin-
ological confusion. The terms "positive" and "normative" have been used in so 
many different contexts that they have lost all clarity of meaning. As is 
often the case in the evolution of terms, their loss of substance has been 
accompanied by an increase in the emotions they evoke. In several disciplines 
(e.g., sociology and political science) this has reached the point where 
"positivistic" and "normativistic camps" exist whose members communicate mainly 
among themselves. When they do talk with "the others" they do so largely at . 
cross-purposes. Although the same trend exists in accounting, I hope we have 
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not yet created unbreachable communication barriers. 
This paper will explore the problem from both viewpoints and will try to 
dellneate areas of agreement as well as the real issues underlying the debate. 
In order to avoid as much of the potential terminologlcal confuslon as possible, 
it is perhaps helpful to (re)emphasize the following points: 
1. . The terms "positive" and "normative" are only retained here because of 
their extensive usage in the literature which is to be surveyed. From a 
methodological point of view the use of "empirical" and "non-empirical" 
is to be preferred. 
2. The reader should specifically disregard any connotations of the terms 
"positive" and "normative" pertaining to the predictive ability of theories, 
the empirical relevance of their assumptions, their prescriptive ability 
(given certain ends), etc. The only basic difference between positive and 
normative theories as defined here is the inclusion of a value judgment 
in the theoretical structure of the latteF. 
3. The term "positivist" will be used to denote those who argue in favor of 
scientific theories which are as value-free as possible. In the philo-
sophical sense of the word none of the authors surveyed here can be re-
garded as a positivist (see note 4). Their adversaries in the value-
debate will be called "normativists". Few of them would apply this label 
to themselves; they would rather choose critical theorists, dialecticians, 
etc. Again, these terms are only retained to facilitate quoting from the 
relevant literature. As general terms separating two sides in the value 
debate they should suffice and their use should not cause any problems if 
the definitions presented here are kept In mind. 
The relative merits of positive and normative theories have long been the 
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subjects of debate in the social sciences. This paper will draw upon the vast 
literature on this subject in order to help clarify the issues. The clearest 
manifestation of the debate can be observed in Germany, from the Methodenstreit 
in the late nineteenth century, through the Werturteilsstreit in the early 
twentieth century, to the Positivismusstreit from the 1960s onward. Therefore, 
it seems appropriate to take representative literature from these debates as a 
focal point for this paper. As Max Weber's writings are generally regarded as 
the first relatively comprehensive expositions of the positivist position in the 
social sciences, his arguments will be summarized in the next section. Then some 
more recent clarifications of the positivist viewpolnt will be presented, fol-
iowed by an outline of the main elements of normativist critique. This should 
provide the basis for an assessment of the debate, focusing on the areas of 
agreement as well as the real differences between the positivist and normativist 
positions. The general implications of these findings will be spelled out and, 
finally, some more specific remarks will be made on the relevance of positive 
and normative research from a practice or policy perspective. 
It is not my aim to argue for a particular position in this dispute. 
Rather, I shall attempt to provide an overview of the debate and to bring out 
its essentials. The method will be almost dialectical: positivists will first 
be allowed to present their thesis as forcefully as possible, whereafter the 
normativist antithesis will be set forth with equal vigor. A synthesis, however, 
cannot be totally achieved in my view. In the final analysis the debate con-
cerns some very basic choices. I am unable to reconcile or transcend the 
divergent viewpoints involved. All I shall be able to do is to properly set the 
stage for their discussion. To pursue this metaphor just a bit further: I 
shall argue that the role of value judgments in scientifie reasoning can be 
properly shown only in the two-act play of methodology and social philosophy. 
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After these lengthly preludes it is high time we hear some real actors. Enter 
the positivists. 
The Weberian Position 
Weber (1917, p. 239) defined value judgments (Werturteile or Wertungen) as 
- "practical evaluations regarding the desirability or undesirability of social 
facts from ethical, cultural or other points of view". ' Thus, in the context 
of scientific reasoning, value judgments refer to the scientist's evaluation of 
empirical facts. Such evaluations should be clearly distinguished from the ob-
servations of facts. The truth-value of factual observations and the validity 
of norms underlying value judgments are "absolutely heterogeneous in character" 
according to Weber (1917, p. 241). 
This position does not imply that value judgments are to be withdrawn from 
scientific discussion altogether (Weber, 1904). First of all, the appropri-
ateness of certain means for achieving a given end is open to scientific analysis. 
Thus, if we can estimate the chances of attaining the given end by the available 
means, we can indirectly criticize the end itself as practically meaningful or 
meaningless within the prevailing conditions. Further, we can try to assess 
the side effects of employing certain means thereby enabling the actor to weigh 
the "costs" of these means (in terms of the predictable loss of other values) 
against the chance of achieving the desired end. Finally, we can analyze the 
value judgments which exist in practice, test their internal consistency and 
arrive at the ultimate standards underlying these value judgments. Whether 
these ultimate standards should be adhered to, however, is the personal choice 
of the actor; it involves "will and conscience," not empirical knowledge. 
Weber (1904, p. 6) has summarized this position as follows: "An empirical 
science cannót teil anyone what he should do, but rather what he can do and, 
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under certain circumstances, what he wishes to do." 
Although the problems of the empirical sciences can be addressed in a 
"value-free"—i.e., non-evaluative—manner, these problems are selected by their 
"value-relevance" (Wertbeziehung), which Weber (1917, p. 250) defined as "... 
the philosophical interpretation of that specifically scientific 'interest' 
which determines the selection of a given subject-matter and the problems of an 
empirical analysis". These interests direct the purely empirical scientific 
work. They can be determined through value discussions, which Weber regarded 
as very fruitful. They not only provide potential problems for investigation, 
they also aid in the development of value-interpretations (i.e., possible 
meaningful attitudes towards given phenomena) and they can clarify the really 
unbridgeable ultimate standards of value which keep opponents apart: "We are 
far removed, then, from the view that the demand for the exclusion of value 
judgments in empirical analysis implies that discussion of evaluations are 
sterile or meaningless" (Weber, 1917, p. 243). 
The Weberian position thus strives for a separation between "objective" 
science and "subjective" value judgments. At the same time, it recognizes that 
values exert a strong influence on the scientific effort and the (type of) 
results it will produce because of this Wertbeziehung. The latter takes the 
fora of, e.g., specific, "one-sided" viewpoints directing the selection, analysis 
and organization of the empirical object (Weber, 1904, p. 24); of personal 
answers to the question whether the results are "worth knowing" (Weber, 1919, 
p. 599) and of more general forces directing scientific activity (Weber, 1917, 
p. 251). However, Weber maintains that the (external) value-relevance of 
science does not render it impossible to keep scientific statements and theories 
(internally) value-free. 
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In the social sciences the debate on value judgments focuses on the choice 
of goals according to Weber (1917, p. 240). Such choices often have to be made 
to enable meaningful social research. Hls position is that one can agree to 
accept certain goals as "given a priori" but not as "fact." Only "facts" 
are open to scientlfic scrutiny; the individual evaluation guiding the choice 
of goals can be an object of value-discussions but not of sciéntific critique. 
In scientlfic analysis the normative validity of the goals is disregarded. 
As scientlfic statements are, therefore, devoid of normative content, they cannever 
be used to justify or legitimize norms. With respect to economics he has specifically 
remarked that what is economically rational is not necessarily justified norma-
tively: "... indisputably 'technically correct' economie rationalizations are 
not legitimized in an evaluative sense through this quality alone" (Weber, 1917, 
p. 168)." A separate decision is required to determine whether ve really want 
to pursue the economie rationaJLity embedded in our models as the (only) norm in 
practice. This separation of facts and value judgments is necessary to enable 
both the scientlfic debate and the value discussions, both of which are valuable 
in their own rights. 
An accounting example: The Weberian -position allows us to investigate 
the consequences of hypothetically assuming -that the objective of financieel 
statements is "usefulness for decision-making by investors and creditors". The 
faat i^hat this assumption serves as a basis for empirical research does not* how-
ever* imply its justification in any real world setting* not even if we can come 
up with a system which perfectly meets this objective. Weber would argue i^iat 
#ze sélection of ühis particülar objective is probdbly to be explained by ühe 
value-background of the researcher(s). In sciéntific research this value-back-
ground should be ignored as irrelevant. At the same time* however* researchers 
are encouraged by Weber to discuss their (implicit) values: Why select investors 
and creditors as the relevant user groups? Why Ohe emphasis on decision-making 
instead of stewardship or attitudes? etc. Such questions are very important 
in the Wéberian view* but they should not be regarded as answerable by science. 
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Further Clarifications; A Popperian Viewpoint 
As mentioned in the introductory section, the debate on the merits of 
positive and normative theories certainly did not stop with the Werturteilsstreit 
in which Max Weber was involved. Subsequent thinkers contributed further con-
ceptual and terminological clarifications. A foremost writer in the positivistic 
camp, whose views will be summarized here, has been Hans Albert, a professed 
Popperian. 
Elaborating Weber's remarks on the absplutely heterogeneous character of 
(8 the various issues involved, Albert (1963, p. 180) distinguished three problems: 
1. The problem of the value basis of the social sciences: the question as to 
whether some basic evaluations underlie scientific statements. 
2. The problem of evaluations in the empirical domain of the social sciences: 
the question as to whether these sciences should make such evaluations the 
object of their statements. 
3. The problem of value judgments proper: the question as to whether the 
scientific statements themselves should exhibit the characteristics of 
value judgments. 
As to the first problem, Albert (1963, p. 181) observes that there is no 
need to argue about the necessity of evaluative viewpoints in making basic 
decisions concerning, for example, the choice of problems, the acceptability of 
methods, the usefulness of hypotheses and the relevance of certain observations 
for the problems at hand. It is perfectly clear that such evaluations have to be 
made by the researcher. Furthermore, as scientific investigations are necessarily 
selective, i.e., can only pertain to certain aspects of reality, an assessment of 
the relevance of its statements is necessary. In this context, relevance refers 
to the extent to which a real world problem has been adequately covered in a 
theoretical problem formulation. The second problem, too can be no part of 
the dispute according to Albert. As evaluations are a determinant of social 
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relations and actions, they have to be analyzed in certain circumstances. 
Statements describing, explaining and predicting the normative behavior of people 
are, however, not evaluative but factual in nature. 
Therefore, the preceding two problems are not seen aa requiring the scientist 
to include value judgments in his statements. But not so the third problem dis-
tinguished above, the real area of debate. It is helpful here to use the dis-
tinction between object-language (the language in which scientific statements 
about the empirical domain are expressed) and meta-language (expressing state-
ments about the object-language). The postulate of "value-freedom" is expressed 
in meta-language and refers to the construction of object-language. In other 
words, this postulate is itself a value judgment expressing the desirability of 
"objectivity" or "intersubjective testability"; it is couched in meta-language, 
and it posits that the inclusion of value judgments in object-language be pro-
hibited. 
The postulate of value-freedom is an outgrowth of the concept of science 
held by Albert and other Popperians. Following Albert this concept of science 
can be referred to as "critical rationalism". lts basic tenet is the "falli-
(9) 
bility of human reason" ' which implies that we can never accept the products 
of human reasoning as definitively true. Therefore, critical rationalism does 
not seek absolute certainties with respect to its empirical basis, as (logical) 
positivism did. Rather, it strives for permanent critical testing of existing 
theories. Research must not be aimed at confirmation but at refutation of 
theories. Theories must lend themselves to such testing: they must be falsi-
fiable (Popper, 1975). From the Popperian point of view, the fundamental ob-
jection to value judgments in empirical theories is that they represent untestable 
elements. The postulate of value freedom is designed to enable critical testing 
of the entire theoretical system ' and to preclude the acceptance of systems 
which (partially) depend on untestable beliefs and commitments as "scientific". 
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An accounting example: Say that an accounting theory is designed which inaorp-
orates the value judgment that "the objective of financial statements should be 
to equalize income distribution in society". No empirical evidence conceming 
the objectives in the real world will disprove this statement. What is moret 
no evidence whatsoever may refuie the theoretical results obtained in this 
system3 since the researcher can always refject such evidence on the grounds 
•that a neaessary condition for the applicability of his theory has not been 
met. 
Before concluding this section, one problem set should be added to the 
three distiriguished by Albert. This problem set arises out of the complexities 
and, in the case of the social sciences, the instability of the empirical domain. 
fiecause of these factors, the ideal situation for fulfilling the requirements 
of positivist methodology is hardly ever attained. This ideal situation would 
involve theories (or hypotheses) which are consistent and falsifiable, tested 
intersubjectively and empirically richer than competing theories (Klant, 1979, 
pp. 253-254). In reality, the empirical content of theories is often difficult 
to compare: truly "alternative" theories hardly exist in the sense that one 
theory covers all of the empirical domain of the other (and preferably a larger 
domain). In addition, theories often admittedly provide only a partial explan-
ation of reality. If other factors which are not included in the theory are 
acknowledged to be operative, a true falsification is hardly possible. Further-
more, consensus about a true falsification may be difficult to achieve because 
of, for instance, the potential operation of measurement and observation errors 
or differences of opinion as to required significance levels, etc. Finally, we 
may ask what should happen if more than one available theory withstands refuta-
tion or, alternatively, all available theories are refuted. ' These diffi-
culties are compounded by the flux inherent in social systems and by the ability 
of social actors to adapt to knowledge generated about them. Rudner (1953) has 
argued that any scientist "qua scientist" has to make value judgments in accept-
ing or rejecting hypotheses. If our latter observations have any merit, it 
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may be that the social scientist has to rely more heavily on such value judgments 
than the natural scientist to whom Rudner's argument equally applies. 
The Normativist Critique 
As argued above, the postulate of value-freedom is embedded in its pro-
- ponents' concept of empirical sciences. This concept calls for the description, 
explanation and prediction of phenomena in the empirical domain. Scientific 
statements can also be used as a basis for practical decision-making and policy 
formulation. Such decisions will often be aimed at control over the empirical 
objects (Cf. Albert, 1963, p. 188). Thus, management accounting theories serve 
to enable managerial planning and control, while financial accounting theories 
might be used to control (e.g. regulate) financial Information flows. Empirical 
science, therefore, has not only an enlightening function—i.e., it illuminates 
an aspect of reality and increases our knowledge about it—but also has a 
"technical steering function"—it gives us the capability of influencing and 
possibly controlling its empirical domain (Albert, 1976, p. 228). 
But if our technical capabilities to control are increased by scientific 
progress, the question has to be answered in what direction we wish to influence 
the objects under control. Adherence to the postulate of value-freedom implies 
that there is no "scientific" answer to this question. From this arises the 
normativist fear that our intellectual resources will be devoted predominantly 
to developing "means to control" without commensurate consideration of the 
"ends of control" (Adorno, 1962, p. 117). Especially Habermas (1971, 1976) has 
argued forcefully against the positivist separation of means and ends. If the 
social sciences are only allowed to offer technical advice for the realization 
of pre-given ends, a purely "technical interest" will come to dominate these 
"scientific recommendations". Why should we allow (scientific) reason only to 
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influence the selection of means? Does this not pave the way for decisions 
concerning the choice of ends which are not reflected upon by reason, and there-
fore in a certain sense irrational? And wouldn't the social sciences atrophy 
to the point where their "technical solutions" have little value for an in-
evitably normative practice? This is what Habennas means when he criticizes 
the "positivist isolation of reason and decision" and argues that "the price 
paid for the economy in the selection of means is an unconstrained decisionism 
in the choice of ultimate ends". (Habennas, 1971, p. 318.) What he fears is 
that science produces powerful instruments of control while abdicating respons-
ibilities for their use. In his view such a separation between theorizing (about 
means) and decisions (about ends) is not desirable and, in fact, not really 
possible, as (1) theories are grounded in practice - and vice versa, while 
(12) (2) the production of theories already implies their use for certain ends. 
Wishing to make the relation between theories and practical interests explicit, 
(13) Habennas therefore poses "the principle of identity of theory and practice". 
Normativists argue that the postulate of value-freedom implicitly favors 
the status quo (Dahrendorf, 1959, p. 145), both because it is not inspired by 
the desire for practical action and through a subtle process by which the values 
of the interests currently in power are assimilated. By unquestioningly taking 
the objectives currently prevailing in practice as "hypothetically given", 
business economics would also produce "power knowledge" (Herrschaftswissen; 
Staehle, 1973, p. 185) or would contain "unreflected entrepreneurial ideology" 
(unreflektierte Unternehmerideologie; Loitlsberger, 1971, p. 99). 
The normativist critique further includes the following interrelated argu-
ment s : 
(a) The distinction between facts and values is untenable in the social sciences 
since society is the reflection of (purposive) human behavior. As such, 
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the "facts" of the social sciences only come into being under the influence 
of social norms and thus facts and values are inextricably intertwined 
(Cf. Habermai, 1971; Fleck, 1979; linker et al; 1982). 
(b) This can be further illustrated by pointing out that it is often very dif-
ficult to use purely factual terms in the social sciences. Intended as 
purely descriptive, many terms have (or acquire) emotive content. Con-
sider, for example, the contrast between the words "profit" and "surplus." 
As a consequence, such descriptions will reflect their (implicit) value-
background even if they are not intended to (Cf_. Little, 1950, pp. 77-82; 
Myrdal, 1955). 
(c) Focussing on the relevance of scientifie statements, some normativists argue 
that it does not make much sense to strive for a value-free, instrumental 
analysis of means-ends relationships if in practice both the adoption of ends 
and the application of certain means are governed by values (e.g., Loitlsberger, 
1971). 
(d) Many normativists point to fundamental differences between the natural 
sciences and the social sciences and argue that these differences should 
be reflected in the respective methodologies. For our discussion, the 
main difference is that the objects of the social sciences themselves 
entertain values which guide their behavior. Therefore, the formulation of 
theoretical statements may, in the social sciences, influence the behavior 
of its objects, intentionally or unintentionally. 
(e) Finally, some of the positivist distinctions discussed above are regarded 
as artificial. If values admittedly influence the choice of research 
topics, the analytical framework used, etc., many normativists would argue 
that the theoretical results are to a large extent predetérmined. 
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Furthermore, the necessity to select certain aspects of reality, the re-
sultant "one-sidedness" of the hypotheses and the positivist methodological 
requirements may (and will in fact) introducé a bias in the knowledge pro-
duced by science. ' And, finally, the distinction between a value judge-
ment expressed in meta-language and one expressed in object-language is 
questioned. This distinction aeems rather artificial to normatiyists. They 
point out that positivists justify their prohibition of value judgments in 
in object-language by referring to a value judgment in meta-language. The 
latter, however, are left unjustified and cannot, in fact, be justified 
since this would lead to infinite regress in language levels. 
In view of the limited space available, the normativist alternatives to 
the positivist position will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that they 
all allow the incorporation of normative premises in theoretical systems; they 
can be broadly grouped in two categories: 
1. Those who propose the inclusion of value premises in theoretical systems 
which are used to evaluate the outcomes of descriptive analyses which are 
to be conducted as value-free as possible (e.g., Staehle, 1973); 
2. Those who propose the inclusion of normative premises as axioms of theo-
retical systems. This would lead to different theoretical systems (in 
a pluralist society), but the relevance of these systems from different 
normative viewpoints would be explicit (e.g., Loitlsberger, 1971). 
From a positivist point of view such normative premises may be added as hypo-
thetical statements to theories in order to arrive at prescriptions. From the 
normativist standpoint, however, this is insufficiënt. It excludes these premises 
from theoretical debate and confers upon the reina in ing theory an aura of 
"objective knowledge", which is unwarranted from the normativist point of view. 
An accounting example: A type-1 normativist would welcome the addition of a 
normative viewpoint to accounting theories in order to assess the desirdbility 
of results. C1^ por example, the viewpoint that "corporate reports should be 
gust as informative to supptiers of labor as to suppliers of capital". A type-2 
normativist would welaame the development of different theoretical systems based 
on a number of divergent viewpoints. Both would insist that these viewpoints be 
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explioitly inaorporated in theories to aïlow theoretioal debate about them. 
An Assessment 
Reviewing the debate, the following points of agreement can be established 
between most positivists and normativists: 
1. the indispensability of value judgments in the design of scientifie research. 
Positivists, however, would argue that these value judgments are "pre-
scientific" and/or "of a different kind" (Albert's first problem) than the 
judgments the real debate focuses on; a distinction normativists cannot accept. 
2. the necessity of making value judgments in the practical application of 
scientifie knowledge; 
3. the value-laden character of the postulate of value-freedom itself (albeit 
in meta-language according to the positivists); 
4. the meaningfulness of value discussions or, as Popper would say, metaphysical 
systems of belief. 
The basic difference between the two positions can perhaps be illustrated 
most clearly by interpreting the postulate of value-freedom as an operationalized 
criterion of demarcation. A criterion of demarcation is "designed to demarcate 
systems of scientifie statements from perfectly meaningful systems of metaphysical 
statements" (Popper, 1975, p. 312) and thus to differentiate between science and 
non-science. His criterion is "a proposal for an agreement or convention" 
(p. 37). In arriving at this proposal he has been "guided, in the last analysis, 
by value judgments and predilections" (p. 38). His proposal is to accept only 
those empirical systems as scientifie which can be refuted by experience. Thus, 
he arrivés at the (negative) criterion of demarcation known as "falsifiability". 
The fundamental objection to inclusion of value judgments in the empirical 
sciences is that they are not falsifiable. 
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By interpreting the postulate of value-neutrality as an operationalized 
demarcation criterion, it becomes clear why Albert (1963, p. 207) can agree with 
many critical points raised by neonormativists but at the same time feels that 
their objectives can be reached without rendering the empirical sciences nonnative. 
What is at stake is the exact function of scientific knowledge in achieving 
these objectives. Is its function only to "enlighten" and to "indicate the 
hypothetically possible courses of action", as the positivist position would 
imply or is it more than that? Positivists agree that in arriving at their 
"hypothetical premises" they have made all kinds of value judgments ranging from 
the acceptance of a certain concept of science to the specifie design of a re-
search study. These value judgments should not, however, be included in the 
theoretical systerns as such, as they would hamper testability. Normativists 
argue that they should be included, mainly to make explicit the value judgments 
which would otherwise remain implicit and to show the correspondence between 
theory and practice (or, more specifically, interests existing in practice). 
Comparing both positions, it is clear that the decision to accept the 
Fopperian criterion of demarcation leads to narrower margins within which to 
conduct scientific activity. The value judgments pertaining to the hypothetical 
premises, the nonnative evaluation of theoretical results as well as the prac-
tical evaluations of their implications are excluded. On the one hand, this is 
its strength; requiring, as it does, that scientific theories be intersubjectively 
testable and open to critical discussion of their empirical content. On the 
other hand, this restrictive deflnition of the scientific domain raises questions 
about the "missing links" in the relationships between theory and practice. 
Which values have spurred the research undertaken? How are these connected with 
practical interests? Which interest groups in the real world will find the 
results useful? Are the abilities to contract for research and/or to use its 
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results evenly distributed over society's interest groups? And who is responsible 
for the use made of the resulting theories? These questions indicate that ai 
theory of social knowledge production and use is a necessary complement to any 
scientific methodology or epistemology. If we label these areas "extrascientific" 
we cannot leave them to be no man's land. ' 
Furthermore, there is merit to some of the more specific elements of the 
nonaativist critique, as many positivists would admit. It is, for instance, 
very difficult to distinguish between facts and values and, as we are never 
completely aware of the influence of our values upon our observations and 
analyses, these may in fact be value-laden. If, in addition and because of 
necessary selectivity, we can only offer partial explanations, we may invite 
"one-sidedness" (i.e., partiality) not only in the hypotheses selected but sub-
sequently in the results as well. 
On the other hand, many normativists should be willing to admit that there 
is at least some usefulness in distinguishing between facts and value judgments. 
After all, they themselves often criticize the implicit value judgments in 
positive theories and point out their Impact on the "facts" reported. Such 
criticism, it will be clear, rests on some kind of separation of facts and value 
judgments. Exactly such a separation is a necessary condition for the inter-
sub jective agreement on "facts". 
Finally, with respect to the partiality of theoretical knowledge, we may 
consider Albert's remark (1963, p. 186) that a theory of revolutions is not only 
interesting for revolutionaries but also for their opponents. I am tempted to 
add that the reverse is true for theories of the status quo. However, whether 
theories of revolutions will develop is, of course, a function of social condi-
tions, again highlighting the need for an analysis of the relationships between 
theory and practice. 
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Some General Implications 
Finally, we may attempt to derive some general implications from the fore-
going discussion. If the preceding overview and assessment are correct, these 
implications can be stated as follows: 
1. The postulate of value-freedom depends, in the last analysis, on the value 
judgments guiding the choice of a concept of science and a corresponding 
demarcation criterion. Therefore, there is no "inherent" or "objective" 
superiority in any of the positions surveyed here. 
2. If this is so, there is no reason to disqualify either positive research 
or normative research on the basis of this characteristic alone. Likewise, 
no opinion as to whether such research is "scientifie" or not can be drawn 
without reference to the choices indicated above. 
3. The Popperian criterion of demarcation—falsifiability—requires that 
empirical systerns are "capable of being tested by experience" (Popper, 1975, 
p. 40). The requirement of testability is less restrictive than the re-
quirement that it should be possible to test these systems immediately. 
To state it differently: positive theories do not necessarily deal with 
"what is" but with "what can be".(18) 
4. If the only positivist problem with a normative theory were the endorsement 
of a goal premise by the theoretician, this goal premise could be treated 
as hypothetical and its desirability could be expressed in a supplementary 
statement. Excluding this latter statement, the theory should be testable. 
The fact that this "solution" is normally not feasible or acceptable to 
those involved points toward the deeper issues discussed here. 
5. The more one restricts the scientifie domain, the more need there is for 
a theory of social knowledge production and use. If one accepts Habermas1 
"principle of identity of theory and practice" such a theory and methodology 
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are collapsed. The more one argues for separation of theory and practical 
interests, however, the more one needs such a social theory to assess the 
likely consequences of this separation. 
Some Observations on Accounting Theory, Practice and Policy 
We can now turn to the last area to be examined in this essay: the use-
fulness of positive and normative theories in accounting policy and practice. 
A comprehensive treatment of this vast area will, of course, not be possible 
here. All we can do is offer a few observations. This amounts, in fact, to an 
elaboration of point 5 above. 
Figure 1 gives a very basic model of the relationships between research, 
(19) theory, practice and policy. ' It conveys the view that accounting research 
is directed toward an empirical domain which consists of (1) accounting policy, 
(2) accounting practice and (3) their interface. The dotted lines indicate 
that, in turn, pressures frbm policy or practice may be exerted on research in 
specific circumstances. Accounting theories arise out of research activity. 
The whole process is, of course, embedded in a certain social context. 
Figure 1. about here 
Simple as Figure 1. may be, it does serve to highlight the following points: 
a. The old debate as to whether accounting is an art or & science does not 
pertain to our discussion. Whatever accounting is, research is a scientific 
activity, and accounting research can therefore be judged by scientific 
standards, in our case methodological ones. 
b. However, research is not conducted in a social vacuüm. It is shaped by 
its social setting and it, in turn, shapes at least our image of social 
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reality, if not reality itself. Therefore, the overall evaluation of the 
research activity cannot be based only on methodological standards but 
should take these social considerations into account as well. These comple-
mentary evaluations should therefore be baséd on the "theory of social 
knowledge production and use" referred to in general implication 5. in the 
preceding section. 
Return ing to the problems addressed in .this essay, we may ask ourselves 
whether positive or normative theories will be most useful from a policy or 
practice perspective. For an answer to this question, we may recall one area 
of agreement between positivists and normativists, namely that any decision to 
apply scientific knowledge is necessarily based on a value judgment. Our 
question can therefore be rephrased as: Should this value judgment already be 
contained in the theory or separated from it in order to enhance its practical 
or political usefulness? Rephrasing the question in this way suggests some 
answers. A normative theory will be useful to those who subscribe to the value 
judgment contained in it. The extent to which normative theories are useful, 
therefore, depends on the agreement in society conceming these value judgments. 
If the value judgment is widely shared, a normative theory may be useful to 
(21) 
many decision makers in policy and practice. • If the value judgments are not 
widely shared, however, the normative theory will be of limited usefulness. It 
will, of course, still be of use to the specific (interest) group sharing these 
values. For others, such theories will serve only to further an understanding 
of the world view of that interest group. The normative theories as such will 
be unacceptable to them. 
For positive theories the answer to our question is much harder to formulate. 
The difficulty lies partly in the differences between the positivist and norma-
tivist accounts of positive theories. However, in order to arrive at our main 
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conclusion it will suffice to proceed on the basis of the positivist account. 
Furthermore, ve may examine the ideal situation in vhich positive research would 
have overcome all difficulties and vould have produced a social theory free of 
value judgments. This vould leave all evaluations as to the usefulness of the 
theory up to the users. As a consequence, the usefulness of such a theory vould 
not be evident from the theory itself. Whether the theory vould be useful in 
the real vorld vould depend on the match betveen: 
- the "scientific interest" (Weber, 1917, p. 250) or the "purely scientific 
values" (Popper, 1976, p. 97) vhich gave rise to it, and 
- the interests and values represented in practical decision-making or policy 
formulation. 
(22) 
Positivist methodology has no guidance to offer in this respect. Thus our 
main conclusion is that positivist methodology leaves the question of the 
practical or political usefulness of theories entirely open. 
Let us briefly explore some implications of this conclusion. One such im-
plication is that, if methodological considerations preclude making the "value-
links" to the real vorld explicit, the usefulness of positive theories has to 
be determined entirely in vhat has been referred to as "a theory of social 
knovledge production and use" above. For if a methodological assessment of 
research and theories is to be conducted relatively independently of their 
linkages vith policy, practice and society in general (see Figure 1), ve need a 
complementary theory to deal vith these linkages. Hovever, positivism has, in 
general, remained rather silent on this matter. Furthermore, the scarce posit-
ivist vritings on this subject (e.g., Popper, 1966) have hardly been used in the 
positivist contributions to the value debate. The reason is clear: from most 
positivists' point of viev this debate concerns a purely methodological matter, 
namely the separation of science from non-science by a methodological criterion 
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of demarcation. 
But it is exactly this reduction of science to methodology against which 
the normativists protest! They find it unacceptable to characterize science 
only by its abstract methodological characteristics. This is much too narrow 
in their view. Worse, the attempt to abstract science (through methodology) 
from social considerations will render it a will-o'-the-wisp at the mercy of 
potent social forces. It will enable ideology to present itself as "social 
facts" or "objective knowledge". Furthermore, the positivist methodology does 
not encourage scientists to reflect upon these possibilities. To the contrary, 
it urges them to distinguish between purely scientific interests and values, 
on the one hand, and extra-scientifie interests and values on the other (Fopper, 
1976, pp. 96-97). For a normativist the notion that such a distinction is pos-
sible represents extreme naivete, to say the least, or outright complicity in a 
process of social repression, to say the worst. 
This then, is the basic choice at the heart of the value debate. It is not 
the choice whether to include value judgments in our object-language, it is the 
choice which value judgment to exert in the choice of our meta-language, our 
methodology. We may recall that the methodology of a science is its rationale 
for accepting or rejecting theories or hypotheses (Blaug, 1980). If the norma-
tivist view is adopted, this rationale includes external considerations; science 
is not assessed independently from its societal context. Therefore, we could 
make some, albeit fairly general, observations on the usefulness of normative 
theories from such external viewpoints. However, if external considerations 
are not included in methodology, as is the case in the positivists' view, no 
methodological answer can be given regarding the usefulness of theories from a 
policy or practice perspectlve. These answers must then be provided by the social 
philosophy conceming the aims and role of science in society (such as Popper's 
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views on "piecemeal" versus "utopian social engineering"). From this it is evident 
that the positivists' and normativists' conception of "methodology" are far from 
equivalent. Which kind of methodology to adopt is a basic choice the scientist 
has to make. In making this choice each of us will be "guided, in the last 
analysis, by value judgments and predilections" (Popper, 1975, p. 38), just as 
the proposals from among which we chose. 
Comparing the broader philosophical stances involved in this choice obviously 
transcends the limits of this essay. For the purposes pursued here it suffices 
to conclude that methodological considerations alone will not reveal the useful-
ness of positive versus normative theories. Although nominally we could compare 
one methodology with the other, in substance we would not be comparing equivalent 
rationales. The usefulness of theories can only be determined from a perspective 
which includes all elements of figure 1., no matter how these are subdivided 
over methodology and social philosophy. 
A Concluding Note 
As noted in the introduction, the topic treated in this essay often evokes 
rather strong emotions, to the point that we can even speak in terms of positiv-
istic and normativistic camps. This contribution has attempted to show both 
sides of the argument. For anyone with strong views toward either side of the 
argument, however, that view has probably been done incomplete justice. Never-
theless, the purpose of this essay has been not if the reader feels that another 
separation has been achieved, namely, that between the basic choices involved 
and the many minor issues, terminological confusion and mutual misunderstandings 
which have traditionally haunted this debate. 
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Notes 
(1) SATTA (p. 50) hints at this when introducing its "basic message... that all 
theory approaches are flawed when viewed from the perspective of some alter-
native approach". It alludes to "real issues underlying debates" concern-
ing theory acceptance and to "partialities...[which] may not have been 
widely recognized as inherent in various theory approaches". The different 
cultural and institutional values which may be involved in accounting and 
accounting research are exemplified in Busse von Colbes contribution to 
this book. 
(2) See also Jensen (1983) for somewhat moderated views and Kaplan (1983) for 
a critique of these. 
(3) Thus, we cannot deduce the results from the stated assumptions without 
applying a value judgment in the process. Such a value judgment 
may be so "basic" to the author that its application has escaped 
his notice (cf. Myrdal, 1955). Indeed, only such "basic" value 
judgments, as defined by Sen (1970, pp. 59-64), render theories untestable 
in principle and thus normative in the sense used in this essay. Non-basic 
value judgments may be (partly) based on a factual premise which is suscep-
tible to empirical testing (cf. Mattessich, 1974 and 1975). 
(4) See Christenson (1983) for a brief history of the term "positive" 
in this context. For some time normativist authors used the term 
"positivist" as a sort of disqualifying label for their opponents. 
These, e.g. Popper (1976, pp. 298-300), repeatedly and justifiably 
denied any positivist inclinations. In fact, a major thrust of 
Popper's work was directed against certain tenets of (logical) posit-
ivism (cf_. Popper, 1975). Only the Friedman-Rochester School authors 
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seem willing to apply the label "positivist" to themselves. Unfor-
tunately, this label has been so widely used in the literature to be 
summarized in the next sections that I shall be forced to use it to 
denote those who argue for expulsion of value judgments from scientifie 
reasoning to as total an extent as possible. 
(5) Note that the class of empirical theories will thus be broader than 
the class of "positiveliiStheories as def ined" by the Rochester School. 
It will, e.g., contain a priori theories which are not yet tested 
but are testable. 
(6) This maybe explains why Zimmerman (1980) has such a hard time distin-
guishing "positive" from "descriptive" theory asserting that "Des-
criptive research generally precedes positive research and provides 
the basic foundation upon which positive propositions can be constructed," 
(p. 6) while at the same time, "It should be pointed out that descriptive 
, ..research, by its very nature, must be based on positive propositions" 
(p. 7) which» of course, brings us full circle. 
(7) The translations of Weber (1904, 1917) are taken from Shils and Finch 
(1949); those of Weber (1919) from Gerth and Wright Mills (1946). 
In an earlier definition of "value judgments" in the same essay Weber 
(1917, p. 229) refers to "phenomena subject to our influence" instead 
of "social facts"- As will be clear from the following discussions, 
exactly this distinction forms one of the bases for the normativist 
critique. 
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(8) All further translations from or interpretations of the original 
texts were made by the present author for the purpose of this essay. 
They have not been approved by the original authors themselves. 
(9) Such fallibility, therefore, also applies to the scientific methodology 
adopted and, by Implication, to the postulate of value-freedom! 
(10) Therefore, Popperian methodology would certainly not support Friedman's 
(1953, p. 14) view that "Truly important and significant hypotheses 
will be found to have "assumptions" that are wildly inaccurate des-
criptive representations of reality and, in general, the more signi-
ficant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense)." 
(11) For these reasons, among others, "naive falsificationism" has been criti-
cized by philosophers such as Feyerabend, Kuhn, Lakatos and Stegmüller. 
Lakatos (1970), for example, provides a more evolutionary view of theory 
acceptance by focussing on research programmes rather than on individual 
theories. 
(12) Of course, theories might be used in different ways and for different 
ends, but Habermas' point is that these uses are lmplicated in the act 
of theory production. Note further that his view that thé separation 
of theorizing and decisions is not desirable is, of course, a value 
judgment. It has, however, exactly the same status as the view that 
such separation jLs desirable. 
(13) This leads Popper (1976, p. 298) to remark that "...Professor Habermas 
seems to think that only one who is a practical critic of existing 
society can produce serious theoretical arguments about society, since 
social knowledge cannot be divorced from fundamental attitudes". 
(14) Consider the dominance of efficiency over equity considerations in economie 
theory, as the latter require value judgments in the interpersonal 
comparison of utility. 
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(15) Much like some welfare economists plead for addition of an income 
distribution evaluatlon after theoretical results have been obtained 
wlth respect to allocative efficiency. 
(16) A Popperian answer to these questions is contained in his "The Open 
Society and lts Enemies." (1966) It is interesting that Popper combines a 
methodological position which is revolutionary—i.e. overthrow of 
existing theoretical systems by falsifying them—with an evolutionary 
social philosophy, that of piecemeal engineering. 
(17) There may be an instixunental superiority as soon as the aims of the 
scientific activity are made clear. 
(18) Or formulated more strictly: "what cannot be." This refers to the 
requirement that empirical theories should be able to generate falsi-
fiable statements (cf. Popper, 1975; Christenman, 1983). 
(19) This is a further elaboration of a model in Klaassen and Schreuder 
(1979). For a further specification of the policy and practice domain 
see May and Sundem (1976). 
(20) In Albert's (1963) terminology there are two steps involved in the 
application of theoretical knowledge to real world problems. The 
first step involves a judgment as to whether the theory yields a relevant 
technology. The second step requires a value judgment as to whether the 
technology should be applied. The relevance of a technology as such 
does not imply the justification of its application in practice 
(cf. note 9.). 
(21) In the extreme case of a generally accepted value judgment, the 
evaluation involved might not even be recognized as such, and the 
theory containing it might be considered to be "positive'' 
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(22) In fact, it is precisely an attempt to separate relevance, interest, and 
significance "relative to a purely scientific problem situation" from 
relevance, interest and significance for various extra-scientifie problems 
("for example, problems of human welfare"). See Popper (1976, pp. 96-97). 
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